Do Real Lawyers Use CREAC? by Kraft, Diane B.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Law Faculty Popular Media Law Faculty Publications
5-2016
Do Real Lawyers Use CREAC?
Diane B. Kraft
University of Kentucky College of Law, diane.kraft@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub_pop
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Popular Media by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Repository Citation
Kraft, Diane B., "Do Real Lawyers Use CREAC?" (2016). Law Faculty Popular Media. 52.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub_pop/52
33BENCH & BAR  | 
EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING
I
f you ask a law student to explain how 
legal analysis is organized, the chances 
are good the student will respond with 
something like IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analy-
sis, Conclusion) or CREAC (Conclusion, 
Rule, Explanation of the rule, Application 
of the rule, and Conclusion). Tat’s because 
most legal writing textbooks teach para-
digms like IRAC and CREAC as the correct way to organize legal 
analysis. A few years ago, one of my students asked me if practicing 
attorneys also used CREAC,1 or if the paradigm was intended just 
for law students learning to write. In efect, the student was asking 
if CREAC was like a set of training wheels that would be discarded 
once the writer became profcient. My answer was that practicing 
attorneys continue to organize analysis by CREAC—although 
they may do so unconsciously—because that’s what legal analysis 
usually is: applying a rule to a set of facts to reach a conclusion.
 
But was I right? Would an examination of briefs written on the 
kinds of issues law students often analyze in legal writing classes 
support my assertion that practicing attorneys still use CREAC? 
Te answer is yes. Experienced lawyers do indeed use CREAC to 
organize legal analyses.2
 
Tis shouldn’t be a surprise. An argument organized by IRAC or 
CREAC is essentially using deductive reasoning, or a syllogism, 
which is central to legal analysis.3 
Here’s an illustration using a well-known syllogism:
  
“All humans are mortal” is the R (rule);4 “Socrates is a 
human” is the A (application of rule to facts); and “Tere-
fore, Socrates is mortal” is the C (conclusion).5 
Organization paradigms like CREAC are “designed…to teach 
students to reason as syllogistically as possible.”6 Tis doesn’t mean 
that all legal arguments should adhere slavishly to CREAC, how-
ever. In the briefs I examined, which analyzed two factor-based 
issues,7 the writers often used variations of CREAC in organiz-
ing their arguments. Tey followed CREAC by stating rules frst, 
which were usually followed by rule explanation and rule applica-
tion. When the writers deviated from strict adherence to CREAC, 
it was often to include facts about the case at bar in places other 
than rule application—often before the rule or between the rule 
and rule explanation—and to intersperse rule explanation with rule 
application. 8 Tis was perhaps to avoid “formulaic writing devoid 
of the personal stories that form the confict being presented to the 
court.”9 Indeed, legal writing scholars recognize the importance of 
narrative in legal analysis, and stress that “[l]aw lives on narrative”10 
and “lawyers persuade by telling stories.”11 Emphasizing the facts 
by including them in places other than rule application can be an 
efective persuasive technique, as long as it doesn’t confuse a reader 
who is expecting the analysis to follow CREAC. 
Moreover, CREAC isn’t the only way an argument can be organ-
ized, and sometimes isn’t the best way. Wilson Huhn has identifed 
fve types of legal reasoning—textual analysis, intent, precedent, 
tradition, and policy—not all of which are strictly rule-based.12 
In other words, while the deductive reasoning that CREAC rep-
resents is crucial to legal analysis, “multiple legitimate forms of 
legal arguments exist.”13 Terefore, efective legal analysis must 
sometimes be organized in a ways quite diferent from CREAC.
 
When I explain CREAC to new law students, I tell them not to 
think of it as training wheels, or as the only way to organize legal 
analysis. Instead, I tell them to think of it as a basic white sauce, 
a sauce that every beginning cook needs to master. As the cook 
gains experience, she’ll continue to use this basic sauce regularly, 
but will know when to add a few ingredients to better complement 
a particular dish, or when to use a diferent sauce completely.14 
In the same way, experienced practicing attorneys recognize that 
sometimes it’s appropriate to deviate from CREAC or to use a 
diferent organizational paradigm altogether. But when an efec-
tive legal argument calls for deductive reasoning, real attorneys 
use CREAC. 
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